Symposium: The Future of Law and Development, Part III by Davis, Kevin et al.
Copyright  2009  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Vol.  104 
Northwestern  University  Law  Review  Colloquy 
 186 
SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT, PART III 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AS SOCIAL SCIENCE 
Kevin Davis* 
 
I would like to take up Anna Gelpern’s invitation to define the study of 
Law and Development broadly and to reject the presumption that the in-
quiry will focus narrowly on the law-related projects of bilateral aid agen-
cies and international organizations.1 
I am interested in the relationship between law on the one hand and, on 
the other hand, development (however defined), and it is not clear to me 
that externally directed ―Law and Development‖ projects are always central 
to understanding that relationship.  (Isn’t that a reasonable inference to draw 
from all of the studies that question the impact of those projects?)  Don’t 
get me wrong, I think it is often crucially important to take foreign actors 
into account when trying to understand where the ―law‖ part of the equation 
comes from, as well as what factors besides law might be influencing de-
velopment.  But I am skeptical of the notion that foreign actors are always 
central to the story, especially in some of the larger developing countries; 
do we really understand the legal systems of Brazil, India, and China best 
by focusing on the components influenced by the World Bank and the IMF? 
As far as the future of Law and Development is concerned, I believe 
that it will and should involve becoming even more of a social science.  I 
also believe, however, that the contributions to this Symposium have identi-
fied many of the pitfalls that lie in that direction.  To begin with, there are 
obviously methodological questions about what empirical methods are best 
suited to uncovering the kinds of causal relationships between law and so-
cial outcomes we are looking for and theoretical questions about what legal 
and social variables ought to be measured.  But I think that there are even 
more profound questions to be asked about the entire enterprise, especially 
if the purpose is to give policymakers insights into ―what works.‖ 
The big outstanding questions about Law and Development include: Is 
it ever likely to be possible to generalize about complex social phenomena?  
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seek to explain?  What role should morality play in guiding the questions 
that scholars ask?  How should policymakers use scientific findings that 
may attract varying degrees of support, either across different groups within 
the scholarly community or over time?  Treating Law and Development as a 
social science should involve confronting rather than avoiding these philo-
sophical questions.  But since these issues are common to all social 
sciences, I think that legal scholars will benefit from being exposed to other 
scholars’ efforts to come to grips with them. 
Finally, John Cioffi’s post touched on the interesting question of 
whether Law and Development ought to focus on the study of law (broadly 
defined) only as it affects developing countries or whether developed coun-
tries should also be considered.2  I do not think that there is any general an-
swer to this question.  For some purposes, focusing exclusively on 
developing countries will seem wrong-headed.  For instance, some might 
argue that in studying the relationship between law and economic develop-
ment, studying only the developing countries amounts to selecting on the 
dependent variable, but the appropriateness of focusing exclusively on de-
veloping countries depends to some extent on the purpose of the study.  If 
the point of the exercise is to understand ―necessary‖ legal attributes of 
―under-developed‖ societies, then limiting the analysis to the societies fit-
ting that description may make sense.  The same may be true if one is inter-
ested in studying the operations of organizations like USAID or the 
International Development Association, whose activities are expressly li-
mited to developing countries.  Finally, there may be practical justifications 
for specializing in developing societies or subsets thereof.  Here again, the 
value of assimilating Law and Development to the other social sciences is 
that it would encourage us to refer to parallel debates.  For example, why do 
so many economists treat development economics as a separate field of 
study?  What is the current thinking in political science about the value of 
area studies? 
I do not know whether the kind of research agenda I have in mind is 
too broad to be considered a ―field.‖  It might be.  But, in any event, I think 
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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN LAW & DEVELOPMENT 
Adam Feibelman* 
 
On the threshold question, whether Law and Development is a field, I 
am happy to follow Anna Gelpern’s lead and assume away any doubt.3  It 
seems more fun, and hopefully more profitable, to discuss our definitional 
quandaries and our concerns about the substance of work within the field 
we assume to exist.   
To that end, most of my comments below expand upon Salil Mehra’s 
question about the relationship between international official-sector institu-
tions (the World Bank, IMF, WHO, and development banks, for example) 
and the field of Law and Development,4 with particular focus on the IMF.   
As our discussion has unfolded, it has become strikingly clear that 
these institutions play a central, perhaps dominant, role in the field of Law 
and Development, however defined.  Even if, as many emphasize, the cru-
cial dramas play out in the local context, it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that these international institutions have significant influence in such con-
texts.  Sometimes their influence is heavy-handed, but often it is indirect, 
propelling domestic actors in ways that are not easily traceable.  India and 
China, often cited as counter-examples to swathes of Law and Development 
orthodoxy,5 may in fact reflect the pervasive (if indirect) influence of inter-
national institutions and actors.  Although legal development in both coun-
tries has largely been the product of unique, local factors, each country has 
pursued legal reforms that are largely consistent with the law-and-finance 
project embraced by the international public sector in recent years.  In the 
areas of corporate bankruptcy and debt collection, for example, both coun-
tries have adopted at least some meaningful legal reforms that reflect many 
of the same goals that the IMF and the World Bank (and INSOL and 
UNCITRAL) have tried to advance more generally.6  Perhaps both coun-
tries would have adopted some such legal and regulatory reforms if the 
World Bank, the IMF, INSOL, UNCITRAL, and other international actors 
were not pushing or nudging sovereigns to do so.  But it is easy to see these 
types of reforms as evidence that many ―homegrown‖ law-reform projects 
are at least partly the product of the influence of international institutions’ 
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At the very least, these institutions provide a nice focal point from 
which to consider the broader definitional and substantive questions at 
hand.  And acknowledging the relevance—or the centrality—of these insti-
tutions to the field raises interesting questions that cut to the core of our de-
finitional project.  Perhaps most fundamentally: What about these 
institutions is most interesting and/or important to the field of Law and De-
velopment?  Determining precisely how these institutions relate to the field 
may help elucidate the contours of the field itself; in other words, these in-
ternational institutions can provide a useful definitional test for Law and 
Development scholars.  
Anna Gelpern’s distinction between Law & Development Narrow and 
Law & Development Broad7 in turn provides a nice frame for considering 
how these international institutions may help us grapple with these defini-
tional questions.  Consider the IMF, for example.  Again, I suppose it is un-
controversial that some of the Fund’s activities would fall within a narrowly 
defined conception of the field of Law and Development.  This is true de-
spite the fact that the Fund itself insists that it is not a development institu-
tion.  Since the unraveling of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime,8 the 
Fund’s original reason for being, it has increasingly conducted activities 
that are designed to promote its members’ domestic economic growth and 
stability.  Of particular relevance for present purposes, the Fund has en-
couraged or pressed national governments to adopt and/or reform legal re-
gimes through a variety of projects and activities, including conditionality, 
surveillance, technical assistance, and the Financial Sector Assessment Pro-
gram (the Fund’s joint project with the World Bank).9  These are among the 
activities by the Fund that Law and Development scholars tend to focus 
upon, evaluate, and criticize, quite often with good reason. 
Yet the Fund conducts these activities in the context of a much broader 
project—promoting exchange rate stability in the post-Bretton Woods 
world.  What then is the relevance of the Fund’s efforts to maintain ex-
change rate stability, its related surveillance functions, its efforts to help re-
solve sovereign debt crises, or its evolving role in global governance to the 
field of Law and Development?  The Fund’s broader project surely shapes 
the narrower Law and Development-type activities noted above, though the 
relationship may often be somewhat indirect.  From the Fund’s point of 
view, its efforts to influence domestic legal development will promote do-
mestic stability, which in turn promotes exchange rate stability.  But the 
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elaborate legal framework, and this entire framework is aimed, at least in 
part, at increasing domestic growth and, perhaps, development.  In the 
broadest sense, then, understanding the internal legal domain of the Fund 
(for example, its organizational structure, governance, and jurisdiction) is 
an independent Law and Development topic.   
I suppose that all of this is a roundabout way of agreeing with Gelpern 
(at least I think she agrees) that Law & Development Broad is an appealing 
way to conceive of the field.  Perhaps I am pushing further and suggesting 
that this conception is inevitable.  It not only helps capture the full set of 
factors that influence the practice and process of Law and Development (as 
well as legal development, if these are different things10).  It also encom-
passes the role of international legal regimes (and legal aspects of global ef-
forts) that aim to address macro-economic concerns of developing and 
developed economies.  And as Gelpern rightly observes, it therefore has the 
potential to reverse the ―directionality‖ of the field in very promising ways.  
Continuing with the Fund as an example, the current economic crisis argua-
bly reflects serious weaknesses in the Fund’s regulatory surveillance of the 
threats to external stability stemming from the domestic policies in devel-
oped economies, threats that may have devastating effects in developing 
ones.  To the extent that this is possible, it suggests that the Fund’s surveil-
lance over developed members should be understood as falling well within 
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DISTINGUISHING ―LAW AND DEVELOPMENT‖ FROM ―LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT‖ 
Brian Z. Tamanaha* 
 
In a recent essay, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and 
Development, I asserted that it is best not to see Law and Development as a 
―field.‖11  My aim was not to provoke a sterile debate over whether it quali-
fies for this designation—anything can constitute a ―field‖ if enough people 
count it as such—but to help underline a sharper distinction between legal 
development, which happens everywhere all the time without any particular 
label, and Law and Development.  Law and Development, I suggested, is 
best understood as a label we attach to a host of projects funded and carried 
out by an array of development organizations aimed at countries that are 
tagged as insufficiently advanced capitalist economies or lacking features of 
liberal democracies.  This is not offered as a cynical characterization but ra-
ther as descriptively accurate.  
Legal development is not the same as ―Law and Development‖—a dis-
tinction that the latter phrase tends to conceal.  To illustrate the difference, 
imagine how things would look if all current Law and Development 
projects around the world were to cease immediately.  In core respects, very 
little would change.  Legal institutions in all of the affected countries would 
continue what they are doing, legal actors would go about their business 
constructing the law on an ongoing basis, and these legal systems would 
suffer from multiple flaws, as do all legal systems.  Actors within these so-
cieties—government, businesses, organizations, individuals—would con-
tinue to interact with the legal system in their usual ways (invoking it, 
avoiding it, adhering to it, trying to control it or use it to their advantage).  
Actors both legal and not would continue to push and prod the legal system 
in connection with demands that emerge within society.  Assuming the ex-
istence of at least a minimally functioning legal system, this series of inte-
ractions is the dynamic ongoing process of legal development that takes 
place in every organized society.  
That is not to say that no consequences would follow from the termina-
tion of ―Law and Development‖ projects.  Money that now goes into these 
projects, estimated at around $4 billion since 1990, would disappear, as 
would the small (widely dispersed) army of Law and Development practi-
tioners.  When divided up by country and spread over time this apparently 
large sum is less impressive.  For large countries, taking away this aid will 
have hardly any impact on the daily functioning of the system.  For small or 
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of the loss would depend on what the Law and Development money was 
being spent on at the time of the cutoff.  Development organizations from 
donor countries use some of the money to fund their operations, money that 
recipient countries never see and therefore won’t miss.  Law and Develop-
ment money is rarely used to pay the salaries of legal officials, moreover, so 
the legal systems in recipient countries likely would continue operating as 
before; certain costly and technical projects, like computerization, likely 
would not.  There would almost certainly be fewer judicial training semi-
nars run by outsiders, fewer conferences, and fewer trips abroad for local 
officials. 
Some of the projects that now take place through Law and Develop-
ment would likely still be proposed.  Many of the same reformist ideas cir-
culate in every society today (promoted by activists, elites, economic actors, 
lawyers committed to legal reform, etc.).  Corrupt or poorly functioning le-
gal systems are universally lamented.  Businesses and local communities 
need reliable and timely ways to resolve their disputes.  The rights of labor-
ers and women are issues grappled with in every society.  Attempts to ad-
dress these problems might well continue, though the amount of money 
spent on such issues might diminish. 
Without enjoying an artificial boost from money and pressure from the 
outside, legal development projects would have to marshal sufficient local 
support from influential players to prevail in local social/political contests 
over reform.  Local agendas and priorities would be pursued.  The projects 
would be designed, run, and implemented by people who understand the 
situation, who know what is possible and understand what compromises 
must be made, and who have long-term relationships (social and political 
capital) to draw on in the course of implementation.  None of this assures 
the success of these new localized legal-development initiatives—legal de-
velopment in every country is halting and uneven—but this consummately 
local process of legal reform avoids several of the key flaws that plague 
current Law and Development projects. 
Despite the lengthy record of failed Law and Development projects 
that has developed in the past five decades, one implication of this thought 
experiment is that this record does not necessarily imply that legal devel-
opment is failing.  Rather, it means that while Law and Development goals 
(mostly related to liberal democratic values and capitalism) and Law and 
Development projects are not showing much success, legal development 
still takes place.  China, for example, is regularly cited as a failure in Law 
and Development literature for not establishing independent courts, for cor-
ruption, for the harassment of activist lawyers, and for continued Party con-
trol over the judiciary12; yet in the past twenty-five years many new laws 
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has increased tenfold, a national code is being prepared, a master’s degree 
in law is virtually required for a senior judicial position, the number of law-
yers in private practice has gone from zero (previously all lawyers were 
employees of the state) to 118,000 licensed lawyers in 12,000 firms, and 
now ―more than 150,000 suits are filed annually against the government.‖13  
That is substantial legal development.  And it is not evident that any of this 
development can be directly or indirectly attributed to Law and Develop-
ment projects. 
My thought experiment helps expose the fact that Law and Develop-
ment projects are interventions in a legal system by outsiders.  This obser-
vation is not itself a reason for condemnation—many Law and 
Development initiatives are well-intentioned and might well be beneficial if 
they worked.  But this observation does highlight a crucial factor that condi-
tions the operation and likelihood of success of most Law and Development 
projects.  External interventions into any society face barriers that internally 
produced initiatives do not.  Law poses a particular challenge for external 
initiatives because it lies deeply imbricated within a thick complex of inter-
nally evolved normative orderings, power bases, and incentives that can be 
nearly invisible from the outside.14 
This thought experiment, finally, makes it clear that although Law and 
Development projects are uniformly presented as projects for the benefit of 
recipient countries and their citizens, they are often neither instigated nor 
conducted by these recipients.  Law and Development organizations and 
practitioners must be called upon to justify, and to secure the genuine ac-
ceptance of, Law and Development projects (goals, designs, and modes of 
implementation) to locals.  Otherwise, these projects may invite resistance, 
seen as more of the same old top-down, Western-imposed neo-imperialism.  
Lurking in the background of the Law and Development enterprise is the 
truth that many of these legal initiatives are not consensual but are imposed 
in the form of ―good governance‖ conditions that must be met by recipient 
countries to secure loans from international funding institutions.15  Histori-
cally, the economic and political agendas of donors and their operatives—
not pure altruism—have shaped which countries get help and what pro-
grams are carried out.16 
The extraordinary attention now given to the promotion of the ―rule of 
law‖ is the most spectacular example of a Law and Development-driven 
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legal theorists consider the rule of law to be ―an essentially contested con-
cept,‖ lacking any clear or singular meaning.17  In light of this, it is surpris-
ing that Law and Development organizations claim to have statistical 
measures of the rule of law.  These measures include a variety of factors, 
from opinion polls, to ratings by businesses or institutes, to crime statistics, 
to various indicators of contract enforcement and property rights—factors 
that are combined in questionable ways.  Relying upon these statistical 
measures, researchers assert that the rule of law correlates with economic 
development (duly acknowledging that causation remains unanswered),18 
and aid organizations make decisions about eligibility for loans. 
The effort to produce a ―rule of law index‖ strikes me as deeply mis-
leading.  The rule of law is a political ideal.  Law plays a multitude of roles, 
and it has an infinite variety of manifestations.  It is dubious to suggest that 
this ideal—and its degree of realization—can be captured by any statistical 
measure.  The problem isn’t just that the rule of law—like any ideal—is 
understood in different ways (ways that change by place and time); the 
problem is that no two realizations of the rule-of-law ideal are alike.  The 
rule of law in Japan is not like the rule of law in the United States, which is 
not like the rule of law in France, and so forth. 
These final comments are directly tied to the distinction between legal 
development and Law and Development set forth above.  Talk about the 
rule of law is the product of the Western-driven Law and Development en-
terprise, not legal development.  Rule-of-law talk is immensely popular 
with funding agencies, reflecting the prominence of the rule-of-law slogan 
in global political discourse.  Legal development is not immediately about 
developing the rule of law (although the latter may follow from the former).  
No one knows what the ―rule of law‖ is in any concrete sense, and no one 
knows how to bring it about.  Legal development involves specific prob-
lems involving the construction and functioning of law and legal institu-
tions and concrete, directed efforts at reform.  Legal development is a retail 
enterprise—it’s about improving the functioning of legal institutions, get-
ting them to serve the needs of the populace, the government, and the econ-
omy.  Although I have doubts about the Law and Development enterprise, 
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AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
Yuka Kaneko* 
 
First, as to the issue of whether Law and Development is a ―field,‖ I 
don’t see much need to decide between the answers given by contributors 
based on the respective focus and/or purpose of studies.  There are varieties 
of answers (L-for-D, L-v.-D, L-beyond-D, legal development, etc.), and any 
discrimination among them will limit our future.  I would prefer a definition 
based on our methodological common ground, a common ground in which I 
will join Anna Gelpern for her basic empiricist description of ―Law and 
Development Broad.‖19  One of the attractions of the Law and Development 
school is that we commonly approach ―law‖ and ―development‖ by induc-
tion from the facts, instead of deduction from some given set of values or 
thoughts (for example, rule of law, convergence, legal origin, etc.).  This 
inductive approach can yield values and theories but only as hypotheses 
open to the possibility of disproof.  We never stop revisiting dynamic fore-
fronts of legal development and find great enthusiasm in encountering phe-
nomena.  Applying different analytical methods, we often maintain a 
constant, arms-length distance (as delicate as that of war correspondents) 
from phenomena.  In this orbit, out of what seems at first glance a pat-
chwork of anecdotes, we will continue to develop some larger, consolidated 
discipline of critical studies. 
But can this minimum kind of methodological definition add anything 
new to the stream of critical studies since the 1960–70s, as Tom Ginsburg’s 
second question asks?20  Perhaps, methodologically, we are still in pursuit 
of the same attempt initiated by Trubek and Galanter,21 and we must stick to 
the routine of testing every possible combination of traditional legal ap-
proaches (such as text analysis) with various empirical approaches (both 
qualitative and quantitative) learned from such fields as sociology, anthro-
pology, historical studies, and economics, as far as this field claims a 
science. 
As to the substance, however, we could have reached some new di-
mension by now.  But we are still circling around the same questions (of 
―Law and Development Narrow‖22) asked in the 1970s.  One of our short-
comings in this area is the lack of response to the deepening dualism seen in 
attempts at defining ―development.‖  We know there is, on the one hand, a 
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etc.), and a group of human development-oriented donors (UNDP, EU, etc.) 
on the other.  This divide causes serious confusion in the legal-development 
process of many recipient countries.  The former group appears to have 
amended its definition to be closer to that of the human development group, 
but each has always given funding in one of the two separate contexts, and 
they have never met to produce an integrated definition.  The latter has spe-
cifically aimed at areas separate from economic development, as if there 
were an implicit conspiracy among donors to live separately. Donors can 
thus be pluralistic, but each targeted legal system is a single reality.  What 
has resulted is a problematic legal pluralism: the formal law of developing 
countries is pressed for the transplantation of ―model laws,‖ often copying 
the recent deregulation agenda of U.S. law (a result of U.S. political cap-
ture, according to Daniel Kaufmann23), while the intersection between this 
changing formal law and the existing order has been left untouched amid 
normative confusion.  Yet it is this very intersection where an integrated 
normative answer must be sought in order to conciliate the various socio-
economic tensions that arise in the course of development.  Our academic 
works tend to stay away from this touchy area, sticking to either side of do-
nors’ divided definitions.  Without stepping into this intersection and close-
ly observing the local struggles for an integrated normative regime (or, put 
in Tamanaha’s way, redefining Law and Development-oriented projects 
through legal development, or, more simply, law beyond development24), it 
is difficult for us to concretize any post-modern alternative definitions of 
the field that go beyond the 1970s’ anti-modernist context. 
As to the future of our field, I can think of two roles: Law-for-
Development criticisms, and Law-beyond-Development studies.  We have 
heard enough discussions of law as an instrument of development (Law-for-
Development), where the definition of development has often been mono-
polized by new-liberalists’ interpretation of U.S. models.  For example, we 
see a bankruptcy law model based on the rescue myth of Chapter 11; the 
corporate law model copying Delaware deregulation; the property law 
model maximizing the full effect of ownership over other preferential 
rights; the competition law model of the Chicago school with efficiency-
based exceptions under the total welfare test; all of which are imposed 
through compulsory mechanisms such as loan conditionalities and perfor-
mance ratings such as the ROSC, often controlled by the World Bank 
(which cautiously avoids criticisms, as does the IMF) and are backed by 
remarkably attractive academic justifications, such as LLSV’s legal origins, 
convergence, and legal transplant theories.  One of the indispensable tasks 
in our Law and Development field is the critical evaluation of the outcomes 
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done, since the very origin country of the models is now in an unprecedent-
ed financial crisis.  It is also ironic that the recipients who were the most 
earnest in adopting the same models have turned out to be the ones most se-
riously affected by the world financial crisis.25 
Our next task, then, could be to propose alternative models.  Some of 
the symposium contributors refer to specific candidates or a single universal 
alternative,26 and I myself have been working on liberal alternatives for re-
regulation learned from various comparative-knowledge studies, including 
that from pre-deregulation U.S. laws.27  John Cioffi appears to be working 
in the same direction,28 but recipient countries seem fed up with universal 
models already29—especially after the undeniable failure of the vigorously 
campaigned for new-liberalists’ models.  We must face this loss of trust in 
the legal assistance provided by individual (either bilateral or multilateral) 
donors.  Instead, we should expect an increasing role for a truly multilateral 
approach, for example, in such well-represented forums as UNCITRAL, 
which have a long tradition of appreciating differences among jurisdictions 
and of addressing these differences and conflicts of laws.30  It should be a 
task of those in the Law and Development field to guide such truly multila-
teral efforts in order to ensure they better meet different local needs, as sug-
gested by Salil Mehra,31 Daniel Sokol,32 and other practitioners. 
Even if we pursue multilateral approaches, however, there still seem to 
be some areas left for individual legal assistance, to accompany each differ-
ent path of legal development, as Tamanaha implies.33  Given the economic 
growth-oriented bias of formal lawmaking in many countries, it will contin-
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intersection of formal law and informal norms.  If this redefinition process 
requires any involvement by legal assistance donors, they must be a new 
type of donor, one that seeks to assist local initiatives for change rather than 
to transplant externally developed models. 
A question in this vein is whether the typical approach of human 
rights-oriented donors (such as UNDP and EU), which try to isolate and 
preserve informal norms separately from the formal law regime,34 is correct.  
Experience has shown that this type of separate reform only maintains the 
normative gap and is doomed to gradually diminish and, ultimately, lead to 
the extinction of communal rights.35  It is probably more realistic to provide 
for efficient procedural mechanisms (or ―secondary rules‖ in H.L.A. Hart’s 
sense) that allow the local people to assert their own informal norms within 
the formal system and to re-write the ―captured‖ formal law from the bot-
tom up.  Watching this internal dynamism toward integrated legal develop-
ment (or Law-beyond-Development) will continue to be the most attractive 
part of Law and Development studies.   
I would like to interpret the ―what works‖ approach of Katarina Pistor36 
and Mariana Prado37 in this context of reliance on ―secondary rules.‖  We 
may assist the search for workable procedural rules for local people to de-
velop their own norms, but we should be prohibited from pressing on them 
any more external models of primary rules.  To demonstrate the point, I 
would like to touch on a radical implication of Japanese bilateral legal as-
sistance. 
Although Japan has been considered a source of the ―statist‖ model, 
and, therefore, its economic distress in the 1990s (which was actually not as 
serious as it was portrayed by neo-liberalists) is deemed as evidence of the 
―retreat of state,‖38 its legal experience should be more holistically unders-
tood within the intersection of statist public law and civil law development.  
I will not deny that Japan’s economic success was a result of an export-
oriented growth strategy led by bureaucrats (who were guided by the U.S. 
Pax-Americana strategy of creating bilateral spokes of economic dependen-
cy worldwide, where the United States is always a sole hub) and based on 
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myth (financed by China/Japan’s export earnings), but with two important 
reservations.  First, this Japanese experience was a law-centered one, as op-
posed to the usual statist description:  bureaucrats are extremely law-
centered people (at least in the sense of Rechtstaat); even the Ministry of In-
ternational Trade and Industry’s notorious anti-cartel guidance had to be 
based on each individual bill passed at the Japanese Diet, where both com-
munist and socialist parties had voices.39  And industrial sectors are bound 
by sophisticated commercial-law regimes, where the famous negotiation 
culture is built on the common understanding of what the law is; even every 
household has a pocket-size code book!  Second, Japan’s successful eco-
nomic development could have been miscarried if not for internal modifica-
tions, developed through social struggles, which worked to redefine the 
excessive capitalist orientation of the government from the bottom up.  
Such modification has often taken place through civil dispute resolution. 
When viewed through this civil struggle, the Japanese experience is far 
from a statist model.  The East Asian model seems nothing but a partial, 
distorted interpretation of the Japanese experience, created by the authorita-
rian ASEAN political leaders’ ―Look East‖ policy, which was, via ASEAN-
Japan economic ministers’ meetings, imported and re-exported by careless 
MITI bureaucrats in the new clothes of the ―East Asian miracle,‖ which has 
been harshly criticized in the Japanese academy.40 
What deserves more serious notice is the civil litigation system in Ja-
pan.  Although it has been criticized by American scholars due to its low 
usage and slow speed, the Japanese litigation system does have another as-
pect: it has occasionally been used as a radical tool for social change, espe-
cially where everyday disputes rise to the level of social conflict.41  Lower 
court judges have been trying their best, within the limits of legal formalism 
and judicial integrity, to respond to social calls for solving various norma-
tive conflicts in the course of capitalist development (such as land/housing 
tenant protection, communal rights protection, pollution victim compensa-
tion, restriction of dismissal, small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
protection against exploitation by large corporations, and women’s equal 
opportunity for employment) in ways that reach beyond the limit of formal 
written laws, which often are captured by state and industrial interests.  Ma-
jor weapons for judges are the techniques of legal interpretation based on 
general principles of civil code and constitutional norms, which provide so-
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well-known passive stance of Japanese judges in administrative suits, these 
activist techniques in civil litigations are notable. 
This historically tested Japanese knowledge could be useful, especially 
in a similar socio-political setting where the government is extremely 
growth oriented and the secondary rules for bottom-up normative modifica-
tion are necessary.  Actually, Japan seems a unique donor in the context of 
secondary-rule contribution.42  Its primary assistance (operated by the Min-
istry of Justice) has been concentrated in the civil law area—especially in 
the drafting of civil and civil procedure codes, and also in judicial train-
ing—with a slight technical contribution in commercial law.  It has, howev-
er, never been attempted in the public law area, which may go against the 
often-held image of Japan as an exporter of the developmental-state, or 
Asian-miracle, model. 
It deserves notice that, in this view of Japanese civil law assistance, 
persistent stress has been put on the ―independence of individual adjudica-
tion,‖ which is quite in contrast to the usual concern of many donors for the 
―institutional independence‖ of the judiciary from the other state organs.  
The Japanese prescription has been to improve the quality of judgments 
through technical training in application of laws and reference to judicial 
precedents.  The logic behind this approach is that improved quality of in-
dividual judgment is the best means of defense for adjudicative indepen-
dence against not only external, but also internal, pressures in the 
judiciary—especially when backed by a comprehensive judgment-
disclosure system and qualified social critiques.  This unique essence of 
Japanese assistance has been developed by ex-judges who have the expe-
rience of sitting on the bench for their whole careers amid both internal and 
external pressures on their adjudicative independence.  Without first under-
standing this kind of holistic socio-political setting behind each case, we 
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